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Electoral Competition and Political Selection by Nicolas Gavoille (SSE Riga and BICEPS)
Research in political economy has recently rediscovered that individuals, and not only institutions, matter for economic outcomes: not all politicians are of the same quality. Competition in the political market may have another virtue than its traditional disciplining role: it may favor the selection of good politicians. In a recent paper, Marijn Verschelde and I study the (time-varying) relationship between political competition and the quality of French deputies.
"Financial incentives to work in the context of a complex reform package and growing wages: the Polish experience 2005–2011" by Michal Myck, Adrian Domitrz, Leszek Morawski & Aneta Semeniuk
Title: Imbalanced Job Polarization and Skills Mismatch in Europe
Speaker: Alexander Tarvid (University of Latvia)
Joint BICEPS and SSE Riga Seminar Series welcomes researchers working on theoretical or empirical topics in all fields, but especially on transitional economies. If you are interested in presenting your research in our research seminar series, please e-mail your proposal to Anna Zasova at firstname.lastname@example.org and Anna Pluta at email@example.com.